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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the connection between money and the terms of
trade in the context of a simple monetary equilibrium model with flexible
prices. Money is held for transactions purposes. Because carrying out
financial transactions is costly, households visit their financial inter-
mediaries only occasionally. An important feature of the model is that
different households visit the financial intermediaries at different times.
This is sufficient to ensure that even though the model features perfect
foresight and competitive markets, monetary policies affect output under
both fixed and flexible exchange rates. Moreover, in the latter regime
expansionary monetary policies tend to worsen the terms of trade while
this is not the case under fixed exchange rates.
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(617) 253—2956I Introduction
This paper studies the connection between money and the terms of
trade in the context of a simple monetary general equilibrium model with
flexible prices. In this model money is held for transactions purposes. As in the
models of Baumol (1.952) Tobin (1956) and Helpman and Razin (1982) but in contrast
to the open economy model of Stockman (1980) households are allowed to hold
interest bearing capital in addition to barren money. In fact their
portfolio includes claims on both foreign and domestic capital.
Households pick consumption paths which maximize their utility. Because
it is costly to carry out financial transactions they engage in these
transactions only sporadically. However households are not allowed to
time these transactions optimally. Instead, for tractability, I assume
the length of the period during which no financial transactions are
carried out is constant.
However, as in the models of Grossman and Weiss (1982) and Rotemberg
(1982) as well as in all actual free market economies, different people
visit their financial intermediaries at different times. This assumption
is crucial to make monetary policy affect the terms of trade. This
occurs even though the model features competitive markets and perfect
foresight. In this model, under flexible exchange rates, as long as the
technologies in the two countries are similar expansionary open market
operations tend to worsen the terms of trade. This, as can be seen In
Branson (1979), is also true in the simple textbook models with capital
mobility. However, it stands in sharp contrast to the neutralities—2—
reported by Stockman (1980), lielpuian and Razin (1982), and, for the money in the
utility function model, by Obstfeld (1981). This non—neutrality can be explained as
follows. When money increases in the home country, it tends to raise
prices at home. This reduces the purchasing power of the money held by
those households who visited their financial intermediary in the past.
Since these households can't reschedule their financial transactions,
they must reduce their current consumption. As long as local households
are keener on the consumption of domestic goods than their foreign
counterparts this reduction In consumption is translated into a
larger excess supply of domestic goods than of foreign goods. This,
in turn, worsens the terms of trade.
On the other hand, under fixed exchange rates the terms of trade
are unaffected by open market operations since these change the monetary
holdings of the whole world's residents.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
model while Section III derives Its equilibrium. The effects of
monetary policy under flexible exchange rates are presented in Section IV
while those which prevail under fixed exchange rates are discussed
in Section V. Section VI presents some conclusions.—3—
II The Model
The model is basically a two country version of the model which
is presented in more detail in Rotemberg (1982). Competitive firms in
the home country produce good 1 while those of the foreign country produce
good 2. Total output of good i at t depends, via a constant returns to
scale production function on the amount of labor hired in the relevant
country at t and on the amount of good i invested at t —1.To abstract
from imports of intermediaries only the local good is used in the local
production of goods. Since an amount of labor which is normalized to
equal one is supplied inelastically in both countries,
=
t—i I =1,2 (1)
whereis output of good i at t, K.t—lis the amount of good i
Invested at t—l while the f1 are increasing and concave functions.
Workers are assumed to be paid their marginal product. Therefore the
totalamount of good I at t obtained from investing one unit
of good i at t—1 is f(K1 t—l where primes denote first derivatives.
There Is an even number of households in each country. At
time t households in the home country are assumed to maximize theutility
functIon given by:
v =r [ctln CT + (1—cL) in C] (2)
where and C are the consumptions by household j at t of goods 1
and 2 respectively while c and p are parameters between zero and one.—4—
Instead the residents of the foreign country maximize the utility function
given by
=Tt
T—t[inC + (l—) in C] (3)
where C and C are the consumptions at T of household jwhile
Is a parameter between zero and one.
The households at home have access to three assets, home money
and claims on both capitals. There is thus perfect capital mobility.
Local money is the only means of local exchange. Since money of the
foreign country is rate of return dominated by foreign capital and cannot
be used to carry out transactions in the home country it will never be
held at home. Visits to the financial intermediary for the purpose of
converting claims on capital into money are costly. Therefore, as in the
models of Bauniol (1952) and Tobin (1956), households find it optimal to
visit their intermediaries only sporadically. As in Rotemberg (1982)
I assume that households exchange capitals for money every two periods.
The assumption that the timing of household's financial transactions is
unresponsive to events is made f or tractability. Except in stationary
environments, the optimal timing of financial transactions is extremely
difficult to find when households pick their consumption optimally.
Without loss of generality consider a household who engages in
financial transactions at T, At this time it withdraws an amount
of money balances. For simplicity I assume that wages are received in
the form of claims on capital. Moreover, since money is rate of return
dominated there is no reason for a household who withdraws money at T
to carry money over until period T+2. Thus, must be equal to total
expenditures at T and T+l:—5—
T T CT (4)
iT iT 2T 2'r 1T+i1T+1 2T+l 2T+i
—
T
where iT is the home price of good i at T while CT and CT+l are the
consumptions of good i at T and T+l of a household that visits the financial
intermediary at T.
Once the household has picked optimally the sequence of monetary
withdrawals it must choose consumption at T and T+i to maximize:
ct ln C + (1—ct) in CT + p a in CT+l + pCi—ct) in CT+l









The relationship between CIT and CIT+2 can be obtained by a simple
perturbation argument. These are the consuxnptions at two consecutive
dates in which the household visits the financial intermediary.
Hence the household shouldn't be able to make itself better off by con-
suming one unit less of good i at T, investing it in claims on capital of
industry i, reinvesting the proceeds at T+l in similar claims and con—





=1 1 =1,2 (8)
CjT+2
These relationships which state that the product of the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption in two periods times the return from
holding an asset between the periods is equal to one have been derived by
many authors including Grossman and Shiller (1981) and Hansen and
Singleton (1981).
It is easy to verify that suitably modified versions of equations









f' (Ku) f' (KIT÷l) =1 1 =1,2 (8')
IT+2
where P is the price of good i at T in the foreign country's currency
while CIT+l is the consumption of good I at T+1 by a household of the
foreign country who visits his intermediary at T.—7—
Costs of transporting goods between countries as well as tariffs
and other trade barriers are neglected. Therefore, the relative price
of the two goods at T (or terms of trade) must be the same in both
countries. In particular let R denote the number of units of good 2












C. C. iT 1T+2
But, since the terms of trade are the same in both countrie (6) and
(6') imply that:
T









Therefore, if CT/C* is equal to kTthen CT/CT is equal to
Moreover (9) implies that kT is equal to some constant, say ke for
revenand to another constant k for T odd. The k's themselves are 0
determinedby the relative wealths of the residents of the home and
foreign countries. Loosely speaking (9) and (10) state that the
consurnptions of the residents of the two nations are proportional, The
factor of proportionality thus depends on which country is richer.—8—
This fact is illustrated in the Appendix. In the remainder of the paper
I assume for simplicity that ke and k0 are equal to k and I neglect the
effects of monetary policy on these k's. Stockman (1980) also ignores
these effects.
The intermediaries in both countries hold in the name of the house-
holds the private sectors' claims on the two capitals. In addition the
intermediaries are allowed to issue a certain quantity of money. In
particular, the monetary liabilities of the home country's intermediaries
between T and T+1 must be equal to the quantity of outside money (or
deposits at the Fed) given by NT. Similarly, the monetary liabilities
of the foreign intermediaries between T and T+l must equal NT. Since
households are allowed to spend at r the money they withdraw at T, these
assumptions ensure that not all of either country's households visit their
intermediaries the same day. This is so since if all households in the
home country visited the intermediary at T no one would hold money between
'r+l and T+2. Here, it is assumed that half the households in both
countries visit their intermediaries at T while the other half visits
theirs at t+l. The fact that different people perform financial transactions
at different times is the crucial feature of reality the models of
Rotemberg (1982) and this paper seek to capture. As suggested in the
introduction, this fact seems to be crucial in ensuring that monetary
policy affects the terms of trade.
The governments of this model have no expenditures. However,
they levy taxes, issue local money and hold claims on capital. The evolution














Here KIT and KIT are the capitals of type i held at T by the home and
foreign governments respectively while TT and TT are the lump sum taxes
levied by the home and foreign governments at T. Without loss of gener-
ality these taxes are levied in the form of capital of sector 1. An
increase in money which is used to buy capital is called an open market
purchase, and is the dom:in of monetary policy. Instead swaps of IT
for Kor of Kfor K are foreign exchange market interventions.
2T iT 2T
These interventions have no effect in this model.
III Equilibrium Under Flexible Exchaflge Rates
Under flexible exchange rates the governments of the two countries
*
set the paths of MT and MT. An equilibrium is a path for the terms of
trade, the prices of good 1 in both countries, and the two real rates
of interest such that:
a) The sum of consumptions and investment of good i demanded
by households and governments at T is equal to the output of good i
at T:— 10—
T T—i * T* T_l*
CIT =N(CIT+ CIT )+N (CIT + CIT =fi — KITi=l,2 (12)
*
where CiT is total consumption of good 1 at T while 2N and 2N are the
populations of the home and foreign country respectively.
b) The amounts of money that households who visit their
intermediary at I wish to hold between T and T+1 in the home and foreign
*
country must be equal to MT and MT respectively.
Condition b) requires that:
N 1T CT+l + 2T CT+i] MT
(13)
* *T* *T* *
N [P11 C1T+l + P21 C21] =MT
Since households who visit the intermediary at T maximize















Using the proportionality of CIT and C, total consumption
at Tisgiven by:













"jT+l I =1,2 (16)









































Equations(19) and (20) are very similar to the equation which
characterizes the closed economy equilibrium of Rotemberg (1982). The
knowledge of the sequence of capitals obtained from these equations
directly yields the sequence of rates of return. The sequence of aggregate
consumptions can be obtained from (12) while the sequence of individual
consumptions follows from (10), (16), (17) and knowledge of k. Finally,
the sequence of prices can be computed using (15) and the equivalent
relationships for the foreign country.
Note that (19) and (20) are uncoupled difference equations in
Kit and K2T. This lack of coupling reflects the considerable simplifi-
cation of assuming that only good i is required to produce good i.
These equations are nonlinear third order difference equations with only
one initial condition, namely Kit_i. Hence they have infinitely many
solutions which are indexed by Kit and Kit+i, the two "arbitrary"
initial conditions. As explained in Rotemberg (1982) there are two
t t+l
arbitrary conditions because both C1 and C11 can be chosen at will.— 13—
Onthe other hand, as will be apparent below, near the steady state there
is only one equilibrium path which is nonexplosive and which has no
arbitrary oscillations in the steady state. Before proceeding with the
linearization of (19) and (20) which establishes this fact, it is
apparent from these equations that certain government interventions are
neutral while others are not.
Consider as the base case a situation in which money is constant
in both countries. Then (19) and (20) become:
f(K1T+l) - = p2
f(K1) fi(K1T÷l) [f(K1T1)KiT] (19')
f(K2+1) —K2+2
=p2f(K2) f(K21) [f(K2T1) -K2T] (20')
Consider a particular set of equilibrium paths for
KiT and K2T
given by CK1T} and {K2}. Suppose either government engages in exchange
market interventions at t. These do not affect (19) or (20) and hence
{K1_} and {K2} are still equilibrium paths. The neutrality of these
Interventions is due to the fact that the two capitals are perfect sub-
stitutes in households' portfolios.2
Suppose instead that starting at t, the rate of growth of either
money stock unexpectedly increases to a new constant higher level. Then,
as long asM /M1is still equal to Mt+. /M+jiand Mt /M1is still
equal to M÷j /Mt+.i
,equations(19') and (20') still represent the
equilibrium. Hence such increases in the rate of monetary growth are
consistent with {K1T} and {K2T}, they are neutral. This must be contrasted
with the money—in—the_utility_function model of Obstfeld (1981) in which
changes in the growth rate of money have real effects.— 14—
Instead,again in contrast to Obstfeld's (1981) model, open
market operations have real effects even when, as here, the government
earns interest on its holdings of claims on both domestic and foreign
capital. This can be seen by considering the effects of increasing Mt
(decreasing IM) and leaving unchanged all other ratios of the form
Mtfj IM+i.Then suppose that KltKlt+l, 2t and K2+i are still
equilibrium levels of the capital stocks. Then by (19) and (20),
and will not be equilibrium levels of the capital stocks.
The open market purchase affects capital and hence output. The actual
effects of small open market operations near the steady state will be
considered in the next section. First the equations (19) and (20) need
to be linearized around the steady state values of K and K .As
iT 2T
shown in Rotemberg (1982) there is a unique steady state in which both
production and consumption of the twogoodsis positive? This steady
state is given by K1 and K2 where
p f'. (i)= 1 i1, 2 (21)
Moreover, in the steady state it is assumed that monetary growth is constant
in both countries. Then, using (21) and the linearization of (19) and
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}2T+1K2)
+ f(R2)(K2- 1(2)=—(f2(R2) —
1 + pN1
(23)
These equations can be rewritten as:
(1 —
A1L)(1 —




















MTwhere L is the lag operator and:
— 16—
0 =(2Rp f" (ii.))(f1(R.) — i i 11 1
i =1,2
M










Xu1 + + X.y.=—1+ p f'.' (i.)(f(k1)
—
Xi
+ ii. + 1. =f(i1)
—pf (i.)(f1(K.) —)
Inspectionof these last three equations establishes that one of the roots,
say y1 is equal to minus one. Instead, (A1 —1)(1 —i1) ispositive as
are X111 and (A1 + P1). Therefore A. and 11 are both positive and while
one of them (say A1) Is less than one the other is larger than one.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) establish that for a unique nonexplosive solution
to (24) to exist, the number of roots at or inside the unit circle must










beequal to the number of predetermined variables. Here two roots are
at or inside the unit circle and there is only one predetermined variable
(Kji). There thus exist an infinity of nonexplosive paths. However,
since one of the roots is equal to minus one, there exists only one path
which does not oscillate in the steady state. This equilibrium path can





Note that the coefficient of F.+i is zero in (25). Moreover as long as
money in both countries grows at the same rate at t as it does in future
periods, F1+i÷. is zero. For this case equation (25) asserts that the
capitals converge at the rates X. to their steady state values. This
speed of convergence differs across countries if A1 is different from A2.
Similarly the impact of monetary shocks differs if is different from
2• Hence, given the relationships below (24), nontrivial dissimilarities
in the technologies of the two countries are translated into differences
in the dynamic behavior of their capital stocks. On the other hand,
differences in the population of the two countries do not affect the
roots A. and ii.. 1 1
Even when the technologies of the two countries are identical
differences in tastes can insure that the effect of a monetary shock
is different in the two countries. This is studied in the next section.— 18—
IVMonetary Policy and the Terms of Trade
Suppose the two countries have identical technologies sothat
is equal towhile X. is equal to X. Now consider a once and for all
open market purchase of capital at t whichtakes place only in the home
country. This induces a once and for all increase in M.This reduces
and F2t+2 leaving all F's beyond t+2 unaffe-cted. Note that unless
is equal to one the effect on Fit+2 is different from the effect on
2t+2 Hence the effect onthe two capitals is different unless•is one.
is equal to one if and only if a is equal to .Ifhouseholds in the
home country have a more pronounced preference for home goods than do
households in the foreign country a exceedsand 1issmaller than one.
This is the case that will be considered in this section. Whenis smaller
than one the fall in Flt+2 after a monetary expansion at home is bigger
than the fall in F2+2. The coefficient of Fjt+2 in the equation (25)
which gives K. is —l/.i which is negative. Therefore an increase in the
money supply at t raises capital at home and raises it by morethan it
raises capital abroad. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
An increase in raises prices at home. Therefore it reduces the real
value of the purchases made by residents of the home country who visited
the bank at t—l. Since these residents buy relatively more home goods, the
consumption of home goods falls relative to the consumption of foreign
goods. In this equilibrium model what isn't consumed is invested. Thus
there is more capital accumulation in the home country. In turn, this
raises output in the home country and this increase is, again, larger
than the increase in the foreign country. In any event the flexibility
of exchange rates does not insulate the foreign country from our monetary— 19—
injection.
Since capitals and outputs are differentially affected it appears
likely that the terms of trade respond to monetary expansions. To see
that this is so, using (6) and (18) the terms of trade at t can be
written as:
=-jj (26)
The term in brackets is unaffected by the monetary expansion. Instead,
both levels of capital at t are affected and therefore the ratio of
consumption C1 I is likely to change inducing a change in the terms
of trade. Suppose in particular that at t—l both capitals were equal to
their steady state values. Also suppose that, before the monetary ex-
pansion, K.t was expected also to equal i, the common steady state value of
capital. Then the monetary expansion increases Klt relative to and
thus reduces the ratio C1 / C2 .Itleads to a real depreciation.
Intuitively, when a exceedsthe monetary expansion leads, as prices
rise at home to a larger excess supply of good 1 than the excess supply
of good 2. This puts downward pressure on the relative price of good 1.
The monetary expansion also leads to a nominal depreciation. The nominal
exchange rate at t, e, is given by
.Using(19) and the equivalent




N C1 Mt— 20—
Employingthe proportionality of and C as well as (16) and (17):
*2* oN(M)N e =k *2
N (Mt) Mtl
Therefore money is a central determinant of the exchange rate. The home
exchange rate depreciates as money at home rises relative to money abroad
and relative to money the previous period. Also the exchange rate de-
preciates as the population at home falls relative to the population
abroad and as the home country increases its taste for home produced
goods.
V Equilibrium Under Fixed Exchange Rates
*
Letthe exchange rate be set at e so that P1 =e *
Thissection establishes mainly that the terms of trade effects of
monetary policy are absent in a regime of fixed exchange rates when the
technologies of the two countries are identical. This is so because
an increase in either country's money simply leads to an increase in the
world money supply. Hence all households who went to the bank the period
before the increase in the money supply must reduce their consumption.
So, neither good is in more excess supply than the other and their
relative price need not change.
Under fixed exchange rates the governments do not control their
local money supply. Instead, their collective open market operations
*
onlyfix + e Mt which will be called Mt ,theworld money supply
measured in home currency. This has been established by numerous authors
including Swoboda (1978). Hence equilibrium under fixed exchange rates— 21—
requiresin addition to the conditions a) and b) of the equilibrium
under flexible exchange rates that:
c) The sum of the money valued in home currency that all households
who visit their intermediaries at T want to carry over to T+l must
equal N
The analysis of the model is considerably simplified by the fact
that one of its implications is that the fraction of held by domestic
residents is constant. Since e is constant (27) becomes:
*
aN N C1
• e = * (29)
N N CiT
On the other hand, using (7) and (7'):
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iT iT iTi it—i
Where the last equality follows from the fact that exchange rates don't
change between 'r—i andand from the proportionality of and C'T
Hence:















Since households at home who visit their intermediaries at T must
still carry over MT units of money from T to T+l and similarly for
foreign households, equations (19) and (20) remain valid in equilibrium.
Thus, using (33):
1 +
2 MT+2 f1(K11) —Ki+2











So, if the technologies of the two goods are identical and
Kit_i
is equal to K2i ,amonetary change at t in either country has the same— 23—
effecton the consumptions of the two goods at t. Therefore, by(26)
the terms of trade are unaffected by the monetary change.
VI Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple two country equilibrium model
in which money is held for transaction purposes. While the model is very
simple it is able to give a monetary explanation for the substantial
fluctuations in the terms of trade that have characterized the floating
exchange rate period of the 1970's. The model also predicts that monetary
forces induce fewer fluctuations in the terms of trade under fixed
exchange rates. It must be noted that previous models with flexible
prices like those of Stockman (1980) and Obstfeld (1981) give no
explanation for the higher variance of the terms of trade under flexible
exchange rates. On the other hand, models with sticky prices like
the one in Dornbusch (1976) can also give a monetary explanation for this
variability. It is an open empirical question which of sticky prices
and staggered visits to financial intermediaries is more important in
generating the variability of the terms of trade.
The model of this paper can be extended in several directions.
First, it can be used to analyze both the steady state and the non—steady
state effects commercial policies as well as of devaluations. Second,
it may be able to shed light on the effect of various monetary insti-
tutions on the behavior of the balance of payments and the terms of trade.
Monetary institutions of interest include commodity standards and various
intervention rules.— 24—
FOOTNOTES
'Interior solutions to the households maximization problem are
assumed throughout.
2}lowever, the Modigliani—Miller arguments of Chamley and
Polemarchakis (1982) make it likely that this neutrality would prevail
even if the two capitals had different stochastic returns.
3mis will be the only steady state considered below. There
are two other steady states. One has zero capital and hence zero output
and consumption. The other has zero consumption because investment is
equal to output. This latter steady state isn't consistent with
individual rationality since households can make themselves better off
by running down their wealth.
41n the expressions below double primes denote second derivatives.— 25—
APPENDIX
The purpose of this appendix is to show that k and k depend
on the relative wealths of the two countries. The total monetary withdrawal
at T, M, of a household whovisitsthe intermediary at Tisgiven by
P1TCT + P2TCT + P1T+lCTl + P2T+14T+l
Therefore, using (6) and (7):
MT =' c (1+ P) (Al)
T 1T1T pa
Similarly for foreign households:
NT=P*CT* (.LL2) • (A2)
T 1T1T p
The evolution of the capital holdings of the domestic household who
visits his intermediaries at T is given by:





where is noncapital income of household j at T, which, for simplicity
is assumed to accrue in the form of capital of type 1. Note that (A3)
assumes that the proceeds from investments in capital of type 1 at (t—2)
arereinvestedin capital of type 1 and similarly for investments in— 26—
capitalof type 2. Using (6) and (8):









1( + =f'(K )f'(K )[K3 + + — (A5) iT R 1 1T—21 iT—i 1T—2RT—2
T
and,using the natural constraint which avoids explosive paths of debt:
K3 +I( /R
iT 2r T = (A6) urnT T-
h=t
Therefore, using (Al), the lifetime budget constraint for a household
















where is the total wealth at t of households who visit the intermediary
at t.— 27 —










whereisthe noncapital income at T ofthe foreign household while
Wis itswealth at tif it visitsthe intermediaryat t. Therefore,








So, as claimed, the k's depend on the relative wealths. Note that thesek's
only change when the paths of consumption and of noncapital income change. This
must be contrasted with the model of Helpman and Razin (1982) in which the
relative wealth changes when the nominal exchange rate changes. This occurs
because, in their model, households hold nominal bonds instead of claims on
real capital.—28—
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